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Abstract. Zooming reasoning systems is a mechanism for reasoning using granular computing. The key concept of the
zooming reasoning system is focus, which represents sentences we use in the current step of reasoning. Murai et al. has
proposed a three-valued valuation based on focus. On the other hand, the authors have proposed another concept of granularity,
called visibility, and constructed a four-valued truth valuation based on visibility and focus. However, our formulation of the
four-valued valuation causes some difficulties to extend to all non-modal sentences. In this paper, we explore and refine
connections between granular reasoning and semantics of four-valued logic. In particular, we refine the four-valued semantics
based on visibility and focus, and demonstrate some properties of the four-valued semantics.
Keywords: Granular reasoning, four-valued logic, zooming reasoning system, focus, visibility
PACS: 02.10.Ab Logic and set theory
1 INTRODUCTION
Granular computing based on rough set theory (Pawlak [13, 14]) has been widely studied as a new paradigm of
computing (for example, see [6, 15]). In particular, Murai et al. has proposed granular reasoning as a mechanism
for reasoning using granular computing [7], and developed a framework of granular reasoning, called a zooming
reasoning system [8, 9, 10]. The key concept of the zooming reasoning system is focus, which represents sentences we
use in the current step of reasoning. The focus provides "granularized" possible worlds, and a three-valued valuation
that assigns the truth value "true" or "false" to atomic sentences that appear in the focus, and assigns the truth value
"unknown" to other atomic sentences. Murai et al. have also provided methods of control of the degree of granularity,
and illustrated that such control of the degree of granularity represents reasoning steps. Moreover, deduction, non-
monotonic reasoning, and abduction are also illustrated by control of the degree of granularity [11, 12].
On the other hand, the authors have proposed another concept of granularity, called visibility [5]. Visibility is an
analogy of the term about vision that means the range of vision, which introduces the concept of "range" of sentences
we consider. Visibility separates all atomic sentences into "visible" atomic sentences, that is, atomic sentences we
consider, and "invisible" atomic sentences which are out of consideration. Combining visibility and focus, the authors
have constructed a four-valued valuation with the following four values: true, false, unknown and undefined. Using
the four-valued valuation, all atomic sentences are separated in the following three groups: invisible sentences, that
is, atomic sentences with the truth value "undefined", obscurely visible sentences with the truth value "unknown",
and clearly visible sentences with the truth value "true" or "false". However, our formulation had some difficulties to
extend the four-valued valuation to all non-modal sentences.
In this paper, to overcome the difficulties of extending four-valued valuations, we refine connections between
granular reasoning and semantics of four-valued logic. In particular, we refine the formulation of visibility and focus
by further granularization to granularized possible worlds. We also reconstruct the four-valued valuation, which is
extended to all non-modal sentences. Moreover, we discuss semantic characterization of visibility and focus.
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2 BACKGROUNDS
2.1 Kripke-Style Models
Let P be a set of (at most countably infinite) atomic sentences. We construct a language LML(P) for modal
logic fromP using logical symbols > (the truth constant), ? (the falsity constant), : (negation), ^ (conjunction), _
(disjunction), ! (material implication), and two modal operators 2 (necessity) and 3 (possibility) by the following
rules (1) p 2P) p 2LML(P), (2) p 2LML(P)):p 2LML(P), (3) p;q 2LML(P)) (p^q);(p_q);(p! q) 2
LML(P), (4) p 2LML(P))2p;3p 2LML(P). A sentence is called non-modal if the sentence does not contain any
modal operators.
A Kripke model is a tripleM = hW;R;vi, where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W ,
and v is a valuation that assigns either the truth value t (true) or f (false) to every atomic sentence p2P at every world
w 2W . We defineM ;w j= p () v(p;w) = t. The relation j= is naturally extended to every sentence p 2LML(P)
by the usual way. For any sentence p 2LML(P), we define the truth set of p inM as kpk= fw 2W jM ;w j= pg.
2.2 Zooming Reasoning Systems
Zooming reasoning systems provide reasoning processes using reconstruction of models by generating equivalent
classes of possible worlds [9, 10]. Such construction operations are called zooming in & out [8].
Zooming reasoning systems are formalized as follows: Let M = hW;R;vi be a Kripke model, and L (P) be a
propositional language generated fromP by usual way similar to constructing LML(P). Suppose we consider a set
Γ of non-modal sentences that illustrates the set of sentences we need to use the current reasoning step. The set Γ is
called a focal point or a focus. We define the set PΓ of atomic sentences that appear in the current reasoning step
by PΓ =P \Sub(Γ), where Sub(Γ) is the union of the sets of subsentences of each sentence in Γ. Using PΓ, an
equivalence relation RΓ over W , called an agreement relation, is defined by
xRΓy
def() v(p;x) = v(p;y) for all p 2PΓ: (1)
The agreement relation RΓ induces the quotient set ˜WΓ
def= W=RΓ. Each element [x]RΓ 2 ˜WΓ is a granule of possible
worlds under Γ, and called a granularized possible world. Hereafter, we denote a granularized world [x]RΓ by x˜. We
also construct a truth valuation v˜Γ for granularized possible worlds. The valuation v˜Γ becomes the following three-
valued one:
v˜Γ :P£ ˜WΓ ¡! 2ft;fg nf /0g: (2)
The three-valued valuation v˜Γ is defined by
v˜Γ(p; x˜) =
8
<
:
ftg; if v(p;w) = t for all w 2 x˜;
ffg; if v(p;w) = f for all w 2 x˜;
ft; fg; otherwise:
(3)
Now we have a granularized model
˜MΓ
def= h ˜WΓ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; v˜Γi: (4)
of M with respect to Γ. The three-valued semantic consequence relation j=3 is partially defined: ˜MΓ; w˜ j=3 p def()
v˜Γ(p; x˜) = ftg, and extended by the usual way.
When we move to the next step in some reasoning process, we need to reconstruct the granularized possible worlds
and the granularized model. Let Γ be the current focus, and ∆ be the focus in the next step.
1. WhenPΓ ¾P∆, we need further granularization, which is represented by a mapping
OΓ∆ : WΓ ¡!W∆; (5)
OΓ∆ (x˜)
def= fw 2W j v(p;w) = v(p;x) for all p 2P∆ and x 2 x˜g; (6)
and called a zooming out from Γ to ∆.
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2. WhenPΓ ½P∆, we need the inverse operation of granularization. we represent this operation by a mapping
I Γ∆ : WΓ ¡! 2W∆ ; (7)
I Γ∆ (x˜)
def= fy˜ 2W∆ j v(p;x) = v(p;y) for all p 2PΓ; x 2 x˜ and y 2 y˜g; (8)
and called a zooming in from Γ to ∆.
3. IfPΓ andP∆ are not nested each other, the movement from Γ to ∆ is represented by combination of "zooming in &
out", that is, a zooming in from Γ to Γ[∆ first, and next, a zooming out from Γ[∆ to ∆.
2.3 Visibility: Another Concept of Granularization
Visibility is a term about vision that means the range of vision. Visibility divides objects we can see into two types
primitively: objects inside of the range of vision, that is, currently visible objects, and outside objects, that is, currently
invisible objects. Moreover, combining the visibility and the focus, visible objects are further divided into two types.
If an object is in the range of vision but out of focus, it looks obscurely, and we can look the object clearly only if it is
in the focal point.
The authors have introduced the concept of visibility to granular reasoning as an another concept of granularization,
and have proposed a four-valued valuation based on the visibility and focus [5]. Let Γ be a set of non-modal sentences
considered in the current step of reasoning. Using Γ, we define the visibility relative to Γ. Moreover, we redefine the
the concept of the focus, and proposed the focus relative to Γ. The definitions of the visibility Vs(Γ) and focus Fc(Γ)
relative to Γ are as follows:
Vs(Γ) def= P \Sub(Γ) = PΓ; (9)
Fc(Γ) def= fp 2P j either Γ ` p or Γ ` :pg : (10)
Note that we have Fc(Γ)µVs(Γ) for any Γ.
To characterize the semantic meaning of visibility and focus, we also construct a granularized model ˜MFc(Γ) based
on the focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ. First, if we have Fc(Γ) 6= /0, we define the agreement relation RFc(Γ) by (1), and
construct the set of granularized possible worlds ˜WFc(Γ). On the other hand, if Fc(Γ) = /0, we define ˜WFc(Γ)
def= fWg.
Next, we construct a valuation v˜Fc(Γ) in the granularized model ˜MFc(Γ) as the following four-valued valuation:
v˜Fc(Γ) :P£ ˜WFc(Γ) ¡! 2ft;fg: (11)
Actually, the four-valued valuation v˜Fc(Γ) is defined by
v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜)
def=
8
>>><
>>>:
ftg; if p 2Vs(Γ) and v(p;x) = t for all x 2 w˜;
ffg; if p 2Vs(Γ) and v(p;x) = f for all x 2 w˜;
ft; fg; if p 2Vs(Γ) but v(p;x) = t for some x 2 w˜
and v(p;y) = f for some y 2 w˜;
/0; if p 62Vs(Γ):
(12)
An atomic sentence p is clearly visible at the granularized possible world w˜ if and only if either v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = ftg or
v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = ffg. On the other hand, p is obscurely visible if and only if v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = ft; fg. Moreover, p is invisible
if and only if v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = /0.
3 VISIBILITY AND FOCUS: REVISED
In this section, we revise our formulation of visibility and focus. We have proposed visibility as another concept of
granular reasoning, and formulated the four-valued valuation v˜Fc(Γ) based on visibility and focus [5], however, our
formulation had some difficulties to extend v˜Fc(Γ) to all non-modal sentences. In the definition of v˜Fc(Γ) by (12), we
have used the visibility Vs(Γ) to check whether an atomic sentence p is visible. If we extend v˜Fc(Γ) to all non-modal
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sentences, we need to check, for any non-modal sentence p, whether p is visible. However, it is determined by the
truth value v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜). Therefore, it becomes a circular argument.
Our main idea to overcome these difficulties is to construct equivalence classes of granularized possible worlds by
the following two steps:
1. Using visibility, we construct granularized possible worlds to divide all non-modal sentences into "visible" ones
and "invisible" ones.
2. Using focus, we construct equivalence classes of granularized possible worlds to divide all "visible "sentences
into "clearly visible" ones and "obscurely visible" ones.
3.1 Part 1: Granularized Possible Worlds Based on Visibility
We formulate a set of granularized possible worlds based on visibility and a three-valued valuation to determine
whether each non-modal sentence is visible.
Let Γ be a set of non-modal sentences considered in the current step of reasoning. Using Γ, we define the visibility
Vs(Γ) and focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ by (9) and (10), respectively. We construct the agreement relation RVs(Γ) based on
the visibility Vs(Γ) as follows:
xRVs(Γ)y
def() v(p;x) = v(p;y); 8p 2Vs(Γ): (13)
The agreement relation RVs(Γ) induces the set of granularized possible worlds ˜W
def= W=RVs(Γ). We also construct a
truth valuation v˜Vs(Γ) for granularized possible worlds x˜
def= [x]RVs(Γ) 2 ˜W . The valuation v˜Vs(Γ) becomes the following
three-valued one:
v˜Vs(Γ) :P£ ˜W ¡! 2ft;fg nfft; fgg: (14)
The three-valued valuation v˜Vs(Γ) is defined by:
v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜)
def=
8
<
:
ftg; if v(p;x) = t for all x 2 w˜;
ffg; if v(p;x) = f for all x 2 w˜;
/0; otherwise:
(15)
Hereafter, we use the following notations: T def= ftg and F def= ffg, respectively. We call that an atomic sentence p is
visible at w˜ if and only if either v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = T or v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = F. Otherwise, we call that p is invisible at w˜. By this
definition, for any p 2Vs(Γ), it is clear that p is visible at all w˜ 2 ˜W .
The three-valued valuation v˜Vs(Γ) is extended to all non-modal sentences by truth assignments of connectives :
(negation), ^ (conjunction), _ (disjunction) and ! (implication) illustrated in Table 1. We denote the extended three-
valued valuation by the same notation v˜Vs(Γ). Similar to the case of atomic sentences, for any non-modal sentence p,
we call p is visible at w˜ if and only if either v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = T or v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = F. Otherwise, we call that p is invisible
at w˜. Hence, if both p and q are visible, it is clear that :p, p^q, p_q and p! q are also visible.
These truth assignments are direct extensions of two-valued truth assignments by simply adding the third truth
value /0, and may look unnatural. By these truth assignments, we intend to extend the concept of visibility to all
non-modal sentences. The visibility Vs(Γ) relative to Γ is the set of all atomic sentences that we consider at the
current reasoning step, thus, the set of all non-modal sentences that we can consider at the current step becomes the
sublanguage L (Vs(Γ)), that is, the subset of L (P) that are generated from Vs(Γ) by usual way. It is easy to check
that, for any sentence p 2L (Vs(Γ)), there is some w˜ 2 ˜W such that p is visible at w˜. These facts indicate that the
definition of v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) and truth assignments illustrated in Table 1 are well-defined, and they capture some of the
important properties of visibility.
3.2 Part 2: Equivalence Classes of Granularized Possible Worlds Based on Focus
As we mentioned at the first of this section, using focus, we intend to divide all "visible "sentences into "clearly
visible" ones and "obscurely visible" ones. To illustrate this intention, we formulate a set of equivalence classes
of granularized possible worlds, and a four-valued valuation to determine whether each visible sentence is "clearly
visible".
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TABLE 1. Truth tables of the three-valued valuation
Negation :p
p :p
/0 /0
F T
T F
Conjunction p^q
HHHp
q /0 F T
/0 /0 /0 /0
F /0 F F
T /0 F T
Disjunction p_q
HHHp
q /0 F T
/0 /0 /0 /0
F /0 F T
T /0 T T
Implication p! q
HHHp
q /0 F T
/0 /0 /0 /0
F /0 T T
T /0 F T
Using the focus Fc(Γ) relative to Γ, we construct an agreement relation RFc(Γ) over the set of granularized possible
worlds ˜W . If Fc(Γ) 6= /0, we define the agreement relation RFc(Γ) as follows:
x˜ RFc(Γ) y˜
def() v˜Vs(Γ)(p; x˜) = v˜Vs(Γ)(p; y˜); 8p 2 Fc(Γ): (16)
Note that, because Fc(Γ)µVs(Γ), each p 2 Fc(Γ) has either v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = T or v˜Vs(Γ)(p; w˜) = F at each w˜ 2 ˜W . The
agreement relation RFc(Γ) over ˜W induce the quotient set of granularized possible worlds bW
def= ˜W=RFc(Γ). We treat
each equivalence class bw def= [w˜]RFc(Γ) as a unit of consideration as if each bw were a "possible world". On the other hand,
if Fc(Γ) = /0, we can not construct the agreement relation. In this case, we define bW def= f ˜Wg.
We consider a valuation function bvFc(Γ) for equivalence classes of granularized possible worlds as the following
four-valued one:
bvFc(Γ) :P£ bW ¡! 2fT;Fg: (17)
The valuation bvFc(Γ) is defined by:
bvFc(Γ)(p; bw)
def=
8
>>>><
>>>>:
fTg; v˜Vs(Γ)(p; x˜) = T for all x˜ 2 bw;
fFg; v˜Vs(Γ)(p; x˜) = F for all x˜ 2 bw;
fT;Fg; v˜Vs(Γ)(p; x˜) = T for some x˜ 2 bw
and v˜Vs(Γ)(p; y˜) = F for some y˜ 2 bw;
/0; otherwise:
(18)
We call that an atomic sentence p is clearly visible at an equivalence class of granularized possible worlds bw if and
only if either bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg or bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fFg. On the other hand, p is obscurely visible at bw if and only if
bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fT;Fg. Otherwise, p is invisible at bw.
Similar to the case of the three-valued valuation v˜Vs(Γ), the four-valued valuation bvFc(Γ) is extended to all non-
modal sentences by truth assignments illustrated in Table 2. We denote the extended four-valued valuation by the
same notation bvFc(Γ). Similar to the three-valued case, for any clearly visible sentences p and q, it is obvious that
:p, p^ q, p_ q and p ! q are also clearly visible. Note that there is at least one equivalence class bw 2 bW such that
bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg for all p 2 Γ. Moreover, it is easy to check that bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = /0 at all bw 2 bW () v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜) = /0
at all w˜ 2 ˜W , that is, p is invisible at all bw 2 bW if and only if p is invisible at all w˜ 2 ˜W .
We denote p´ q if and only if bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) at all bw 2 bW . It is easy to check that v˜Fc(Γ) satisfies some
two-valued tautologies.
Proposition 1 For any non-modal sentences p;q;r 2L (P), the four-valued valuation v˜Fc(Γ) validates the following
properties:
• All associative and commutative laws for ^ and _.
• p^ (q_ r)´ (p^q)_ (p^ r), p_ (q^ r)´ (p_q)^ (p_ r) (Distributive laws).
• ::p´ p, p! q´ :p_q.
• :(p^q)´ :p_:q, :(p_q)´ :p^:q (De Morgan’s laws).
• p! q´ :q!:p (Contraposition).
• (p^q)! r ´ p! (q! r) (Exportation).
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix.
Note that, however, not all two-valued tautologies are satisfied by v˜Fc(Γ). For example, for any invisible sentence p
and obscurely visible sentence q, exclusive middle is not satisfied: v˜Fc(Γ)(p_:p; bw) = /0 and v˜Fc(Γ)(q_:q; bw) = fT;Fg
for all bw 2 bW .
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TABLE 2. Truth tables of the four-valued valuation
Negation :p
p :p
/0 /0
fFg fTg
fTg fFg
fT;Fg fT;Fg
Disjunction p_q
HHHp
q /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
/0 /0 /0 /0 /0
fFg /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
fTg /0 fTg fTg fTg
fT;Fg /0 fT;Fg fTg fT;Fg
Conjunction p^q
HHHp
q /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
/0 /0 /0 /0 /0
fFg /0 fFg fFg fFg
fTg /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
fT;Fg /0 fFg fT;Fg fT;Fg
Implication p! q
HHHp
q /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
/0 /0 /0 /0 /0
fFg /0 fTg fTg fTg
fTg /0 fFg fTg fT;Fg
fT;Fg /0 fT;Fg fTg fT;Fg
Now we have a four-valued granularized model
cMΓ
def= h bW ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ;bvFc(Γ)i: (19)
of M with respect to Vs(Γ) and Fc(Γ). Moreover, the four-valued semantic consequence relation j=4 is partially
defined and extended by the usual way as follows. bM; bw j=4 p means that the sentence p is true at the equivalence class
bw in the model cMΓ:
bM; bw j=4 p def() bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg; 8p 2P;
bM; bw j=4 :p () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fFg;
bM; bw j=4 p^q () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg and bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fTg;
bM; bw j=4 p_q () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg or bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fTg;
bM; bw j=4 p! q () bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fTg whenever bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fTg:
For any subset ∆ of non-modal sentences, we denote cM ; bw j=4 ∆ if cM ; bw j=4 p for all p 2 ∆. We define the set of
equivalence classes k∆k4 def= fbw2 bW j cM ; bw j=4 ∆g, and called the truth set of ∆. If cM ; bw j=4 ∆ holds for all bw2 bW , we
denote cM j=4 ∆. In the case ∆ = fpg, we abbreviate cM j=4 p, and called that p is valid in cM . Moreover, if cM ; bw j=4 ∆
implies cM ; bw j=4 p for all bw 2 bW , we denote cM ;∆ j=4 p, and called that ∆ concludes p in cM . Similar to the classical
propositional logic, the semantic version of the deduction theorem is satisfied.
Proposition 2 If p is clearly visible at all bw 2 bW , then
cM ;∆[fpg j=4 q () cM ;∆ j=4 p! q:
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix.
Example 1 LetP = fp;q; rg be a set of atomic sentences, andM = hW;R;vi be a Kripke model with the following
eight possible worlds:
w1 = fp;q; rg, w2 = fp;qg, w3 = fp; rg, w4 = fpg,
w5 = fq; rg, w6 = fqg, w7 = frg, w8 = /0.
We define the truth value of each atomic sentence p 2P at each world w 2W by v(p;w) = t() p 2 w. By this truth
assignment, for example, all atomic sentences are true at w1. On the other hand, all atomic sentences are false at w8.
Suppose we have the following set of non-modal sentences considered in the current step of reasoning: Γ = fq;p!
qg. Hence, we have the visibility Vs(Γ) = fp;qg, and focus Fc(Γ) = fqg relative to Γ, respectively:
Constructing the agreement relation RVs(Γ) by (13), we have the following four granularized possible worlds:
w˜1 = fw1;w2g, w˜3 = fw3;w4g, w˜5 = fw5;w6g, w˜7 = fw7;w8g.
458
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Each atomic sentence has the following three-valued truth value:
v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜1) = T; v˜Fc(Γ)(q; w˜1) = T; v˜Fc(Γ)(r; w˜1) = /0;
v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜3) = T; v˜Fc(Γ)(q; w˜3) = F; v˜Fc(Γ)(r; w˜3) = /0;
v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜5) = F; v˜Fc(Γ)(q; w˜5) = T; v˜Fc(Γ)(r; w˜5) = /0;
v˜Fc(Γ)(p; w˜7) = F; v˜Fc(Γ)(q; w˜7) = F; v˜Fc(Γ)(r; w˜7) = /0:
These truth values indicate that p and q are visible, while r is invisible.
Next, we construct the agreement relation RFc(Γ) over ˜W , and get the following two equivalence classes:
cw1 = fw˜1; w˜5g= ffw1;w2g;fw5;w6gg, cw3 = fw˜3; w˜7g= ffw3;w4g;fw7;w8gg.
By (18), each atomic sentence has the following four-valued truth value:
bvFc(Γ)(p; bw1) = fT;Fg; bvFc(Γ)(q; bw1) = fTg; bvFc(Γ)(r; bw1) = /0:
bvFc(Γ)(p; bw3) = fT;Fg; bvFc(Γ)(q; bw3) = fFg; bvFc(Γ)(r; bw3) = /0:
This means that q is clearly visible, but p is obscurely visible. Similar to the three-valued case, r is invisible. Four-
valued truth values of any non-modal sentences are calculated based on Table 2. For example, the truth value of p! q
is: bvFc(Γ)(p! q; bw1) = fTg and bvFc(Γ)(p! q; bw3) = fT;Fg. Thus, all non-modal sentences in Γ are true, that is, clearly
visible, at bw1.
4 DISCUSSION
As illustrated in Example 1, our revised framework of four-valued valuation avoids the circular argument mentioned in
Section 3, which overcome the difficulties of the previous formulation about extension of four-valued valuation. How-
ever, our four-valued valuation is quite different to Belnap’s four-valued logics based on bilattices [1, 2]. Comparison
our valuation and other four-valued semantics is a future work.
Murai et al.’s formulation of focus is included into our formulation as a special case. Their formulation corresponds
to the case that, ignoring (9) and (10), we define Vs(Γ) def=P and Fc(Γ) def=PΓ, that is, all atomic sentences are visible,
and all atomic sentences which appear in Γ are clearly visible.
If we regard the set Γ as the current knowledge base about the current world w, our intention about visibility and
focus becomes more clear. We illustrate this by using example 1. Suppose we believe Γ = fq;p! qg that represents
our beliefs about w. The meaning of "we believe Γ" is that we believe that all sentences in Γ are true. Thus, constructing
bW and bvFc(Γ) by the visibility Vs(Γ) and focus Fc(Γ), we have a "model" bw1 about w, which illustrates that q is "true",
and p is "unknown". In Γ, we just consider p and q, and do not know the existence an other atomic sentence, r, therefore
r should be "undefined" at the model.
Moreover, if we observe the world, and get new information about the world, it cause some changes of Γ, and
reconstruction bW and bvFc(Γ). This connects to belief change (for example, see [3, 4]) and zooming in & out operations
[8, 9, 10, 11], which is a future work.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we refined our previous formulation of visibility and focus [5] by further granularization to granularized
possible worlds. We also reformulated the four-valued valuation based on visibility and focus, and it was extended to
all non-modal sentences. These results overcome the difficulties of the previous formulation about extension of four-
valued valuation. More refinement of the proposed framework and explore of connections with, for example, belief
change and zooming in & out operations discussed in the previous section are future works.
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APPENDIX
Proofs
Proposition 1 For any non-modal sentences p;q;r 2L (P), the four-valued valuation v˜Fc(Γ) validates the following
properties:
• All associative and commutative laws for ^ and _.
• p^ (q_ r)´ (p^q)_ (p^ r), p_ (q^ r)´ (p_q)^ (p_ r) (Distributive laws).
• ::p´ p, p! q´ :p_q.
• :(p^q)´ :p_:q, :(p_q)´ :p^:q (De Morgan’s laws).
• p! q´ :q!:p (Contraposition).
• (p^q)! r ´ p! (q! r) (Exportation).
Proof.
We show that the distributive law p^ (q_ r) ´ (p_ q)^ (p_ r) is satisfied by checking bvFc(Γ)(p^ (q_ r); bw)
= bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_(p^r); bw) for each case that bvFc(Γ)(p^(q_r); bw)= T; F, fT;Fg and /0, respectively. Other properties
are proved similarly. By the truth tables of the four-valued valuations illustrated in TABLE 2, each case is proved as
follows:
bvFc(Γ)(p^ (q_ r); bw) = T () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and bvFc(Γ)(q_ r; bw) = T
() bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and, either bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = T or bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = T
() either (bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = T ),
or (bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = T)
() bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) = T.
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bvFc(Γ)(p^ (q_ r); bw) = F () either bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = F or bvFc(Γ)(q_ r; bw) = F
() either bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = F, or, both bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = F
() both bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = F
() bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) = F.
bvFc(Γ)(p^ (q_ r); bw) = fT;Fg () either
1. bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and bvFc(Γ)(q_ r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
2. bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fT;Fg, and bvFc(Γ)(q_ r; bw) = T, or
3. bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fT;Fg, and bvFc(Γ)(q_ r; bw) = fT;Fg
In the case of 1. () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T, and either
1-1. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
1-2. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = F, or
1-3. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = fT;Fg
() 1-1. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
1-2. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = F, or
1-3. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg
() bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) = fT;Fg.
In the case of 2. () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fT;Fg, and either bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = T or bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = T
() either bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = F, or
bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg
bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) = fT;Fg.
In the case of 3. () bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = fT;Fg, and either
3-1. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
3-2. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = F, or
3-3. bvFc(Γ)(q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(r; bw) = fT;Fg
() 3-1. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = F and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg, or
3-2. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = F, or
3-3. bvFc(Γ)(p^q; bw) = fT;Fg and bvFc(Γ)(p^ r; bw) = fT;Fg
() bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) = fT;Fg.
Thus, we have bvFc(Γ)(p _ (q ^ r); bw) = fT;Fg if and only if bvFc(Γ)((p ^ q) _ (p ^ r); bw) = fT;Fg. It is clear
that bvFc(Γ)(p _ (q ^ r); bw) = /0 if and only if bvFc(Γ)((p ^ q) _ (p ^ r); bw) = /0. Therefore, bvFc(Γ)(p ^ (q _ r); bw) =
bvFc(Γ)((p^q)_ (p^ r); bw) holds.
Proposition 2 If p is clearly visible at all bw 2 bW , then
cM ;∆[fpg j=4 q () cM ;∆ j=4 p! q:
Proof.
(=)) Assume that, for any bw 2 bW , if cM ; bw j=4 ∆[fpg holds, then cM ; bw j=4 q also holds. Because p is clearly
visible at all bw 2 bW , we have either bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = T or bvFc(Γ)(p; bw) = F for all bw 2 bW . This means that the truth set
k∆k4 is represented by
k∆k4 = (k∆k4\kpk4)[ (k∆k4\k:pk4):
Hence, if bw 2 (k∆k4 \kpk4), we have cM ; bw j=4 q by the assumption, and therefore cM ; bw j=4 p ! q holds. On the
other hand, if bw 2 (k∆k4\k:pk4), it is clear that cM ; bw j=4 p ! q because bw 2 k:pk4. Therefore, in the both cases,
we conclude that cM ; bw j=4 p! q for any bw 2 k∆k4.
((=) Assume that, for any bw 2 bW , if cM ; bw j=4 ∆ holds, then cM ; bw j=4 p! q also holds. Because bw 2 k∆[fpgk4
satisfies both bw 2 k∆k4 and bw 2 kpk4, we have both cM ; bw j=4 p! q and cM ; bw j=4 p for such bw 2 k∆[fpgk4, which
means that cM ; bw j=4 q holds for any bw 2 k∆[fpgk4.
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